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1.
Canadian Journal of Communication ; 47(2):399-405, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2229021

ABSTRACT

[...]as we dream of different futures, we face multiple, competing narratives of post-pandemic work: mass refusal, as we recognize how much of life work steals from us;individual "pivots" to new careers vaunted in the media;the tantalizing possibility of universal social benefits;the cruel reality that a return to "normal" means a return to exploitation, inequality, and the daily grind of capitalism. Facing stagnating wages, poor conditions, and pandemic risks, workers across the continent are collectively organizing into unions, building solidarity, and waging successful strikes and job actions, including baristas, graduate students, video game developers, journalists, and warehouse workers. Yet, they argue, "intellective and physical labour are required to produce messages and the technologies used to disseminate them" (p. 493), encouraging a turn to labour in media and communication studies that has produced a rich and dynamic body of literature examining work and labour as it intersects with media, technology, and culture. A search of the CJC archive using the terms work and labour results in many articles on a range of work-related issues, a selective index of which could read: * care work (labour, technology-mediated work) * creative and cultural industries (working conditions, contracts, collective organizing, policy) * gender and technology (deskilling, intensification, power) * journalists (professional routines, working conditions, unions) * knowledge work (theories of, ideologies of, gendered divisions, deskilling, surveillance, rationalization, resistance) * labour, unions, strikes (media coverage of) This playlist features four articles that hold enduring lessons about work for the pandemic and beyond. The so-called minority union, which represents a small part of the company's workforce, aims to engage in worker activism rather than to bargain a collective agreement, as its wall-to-wall model includes workers outside of the standard employment relationship.

2.
Emerg Infect Dis ; 27(3): 710-718, 2021 03.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1054979

ABSTRACT

Public health travel restrictions (PHTR) are crucial measures during communicable disease outbreaks to prevent transmission during commercial airline travel and mitigate cross-border importation and spread. We evaluated PHTR implementation for US citizens on the Diamond Princess during its coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak in Japan in February 2020 to explore how PHTR reduced importation of COVID-19 to the United States during the early phase of disease containment. Using PHTR required substantial collaboration among the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, other US government agencies, the cruise line, and public health authorities in Japan. Original US PHTR removal criteria were modified to reflect international testing protocols and enable removal of PHTR for persons who recovered from illness. The impact of PHTR on epidemic trajectory depends on the risk for transmission during travel and geographic spread of disease. Lessons learned from the Diamond Princess outbreak provide critical information for future PHTR use.


Subject(s)
COVID-19/transmission , Communicable Diseases, Imported/prevention & control , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Quarantine , Travel , Adolescent , Adult , Aged , Aged, 80 and over , Child , Child, Preschool , Female , Government , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Risk Factors , Ships , United States/epidemiology , Young Adult
3.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(45): 1681-1685, 2020 Nov 13.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-922983

ABSTRACT

In January 2020, with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CDC instituted an enhanced entry risk assessment and management (screening) program for air passengers arriving from certain countries with widespread, sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The objectives of the screening program were to reduce the importation of COVID-19 cases into the United States and slow subsequent spread within states. Screening aimed to identify travelers with COVID-19-like illness or who had a known exposure to a person with COVID-19 and separate them from others. Screening also aimed to inform all screened travelers about self-monitoring and other recommendations to prevent disease spread and obtain their contact information to share with public health authorities in destination states. CDC delegated postarrival management of crew members to airline occupational health programs by issuing joint guidance with the Federal Aviation Administration.* During January 17-September 13, 2020, a total of 766,044 travelers were screened, 298 (0.04%) of whom met criteria for public health assessment; 35 (0.005%) were tested for SARS-CoV-2, and nine (0.001%) had a positive test result. CDC shared contact information with states for approximately 68% of screened travelers because of data collection challenges and some states' opting out of receiving data. The low case detection rate of this resource-intensive program highlighted the need for fundamental change in the U.S. border health strategy. Because SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission can occur in the absence of symptoms and because the symptoms of COVID-19 are nonspecific, symptom-based screening programs are ineffective for case detection. Since the screening program ended on September 14, 2020, efforts to reduce COVID-19 importation have focused on enhancing communications with travelers to promote recommended preventive measures, reinforcing mechanisms to refer overtly ill travelers to CDC, and enhancing public health response capacity at ports of entry. More efficient collection of contact information for international air passengers before arrival and real-time transfer of data to U.S. health departments would facilitate timely postarrival public health management, including contact tracing, when indicated. Incorporating health attestations, predeparture and postarrival testing, and a period of limited movement after higher-risk travel, might reduce risk for transmission during travel and translocation of SARS-CoV-2 between geographic areas and help guide more individualized postarrival recommendations.


Subject(s)
Airports , Communicable Diseases, Imported/prevention & control , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Mass Screening , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , COVID-19 , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Communicable Diseases, Imported/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Humans , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Risk Assessment , Travel , United States/epidemiology
4.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep ; 69(12): 347-352, 2020 03 27.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-18476

ABSTRACT

An estimated 30 million passengers are transported on 272 cruise ships worldwide each year* (1). Cruise ships bring diverse populations into proximity for many days, facilitating transmission of respiratory illness (2). SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was first identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and has since spread worldwide to at least 187 countries and territories. Widespread COVID-19 transmission on cruise ships has been reported as well (3). Passengers on certain cruise ship voyages might be aged ≥65 years, which places them at greater risk for severe consequences of SARS-CoV-2 infection (4). During February-March 2020, COVID-19 outbreaks associated with three cruise ship voyages have caused more than 800 laboratory-confirmed cases among passengers and crew, including 10 deaths. Transmission occurred across multiple voyages of several ships. This report describes public health responses to COVID-19 outbreaks on these ships. COVID-19 on cruise ships poses a risk for rapid spread of disease, causing outbreaks in a vulnerable population, and aggressive efforts are required to contain spread. All persons should defer all cruise travel worldwide during the COVID-19 pandemic.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Global Health/statistics & numerical data , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , Public Health Practice , Ships , Travel-Related Illness , Adult , Aged , Betacoronavirus/isolation & purification , COVID-19 , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Female , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Pneumonia, Viral/diagnosis , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Risk Factors , SARS-CoV-2 , United States/epidemiology
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